



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Level 27 Oct
 File 5 Oct SIA
 meeting
 81-8610

SECRET

October 26, 1981

NSC review completed - may be declassified in
 full

MEMORANDUM FOR: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke-8141141
 NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz -8131142
 DOD - Mr. Jay Rixse-8131143
 JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell-8131144
 CIA -
 ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey-8131146
 OMB - Mr. William Schneider -8131147


25X1

SUBJECT: Senior Interdepartmental Group No. 9:
 Recommendations

Attached is a draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) for United States CBW arms control policy. It is derived from the October 7 Summary of Issues and Recommendations issued on the basis of the SIG meeting on October 5, and incorporates interagency amendments to that paper. Editorial changes have been made where necessary to conform with standard NSDD practice.

On page 3 of the draft NSDD, ACDA has provided a footnote seeking to clarify the meaning of one subparagraph. Agency comments on this clarification are invited.

Addressees are requested to review the draft NSDD at a senior policy level. Concurrence should be telephoned to Mr. Tain Tompkins, 632-5804. Comments and suggested revisions are requested in writing to this office by COB Wednesday, October 28, so that the final NSDD may be forwarded to the NSC by Friday, October 30.


 L. Paul Bremer, III
 Executive Secretary

Attachment.

As stated.

State Dept. review
 completed

SECRET
 GDS 10/23/87

DRAFTSECRETNSC review completed - may be declassified in
full

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER _____

UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL POLICY

I have reviewed the interagency recommendations on United States chemical and biological weapons arms control policy and approve the policies set forth below.

To encourage compliance with the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention, the United States will:

(1) Intensify its public information campaign and use the 36th United Nations General Assembly debate, particularly the debate in the First (Political) Committee on the issue of reports of chemical weapons use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea, and discussions in the Committee on Disarmament and other international fora to continue to expose the chemical and biological warfare activities of the Soviet Union and its associated states to international scrutiny and pressure;

(2) Seek to convene* a meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention with the aim of strengthening its verification and compliance mechanisms

* The phrase "Seek to convene" represents the policy decision which is required, and is used without prejudice to tactical judgments (i.e., whether the US would propose the meeting or support the Swedish proposal for a meeting of States Parties) to be made once policy approval is obtained.

SECRET
GDS 10/22/87

SECRET

- 2 -

in light of possible Soviet non-compliance, and to provide an additional forum for maintaining international pressure on the Soviet Union over its chemical and biological warfare activities; and

(3) After assessing the results of the steps above, and after evaluating analyses of United States positions, consider invoking the other two remedies provided by the Biological Weapons Convention:

(a) taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council, and

(b) as an ultimate step, withdrawing from the Biological Weapons Convention.

To provide the basis for proceeding with (3) above, the Government is directed to study and submit recommendations on:

- specific measures to strengthen the verification and compliance provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the relationship of the United States' position on biological warfare to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies;
- consultations with United States allies on a strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere; and
- the legal issues associated with formally charging the Soviet Union with violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

SECRET

SECRET
- 3 -

In support of chemical weapons arms control, the United States will:

(1) Support the eventual objective of concluding a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons production, development and stockpiling;

(2) Ensure that current chemical warfare modernization plans proceed so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent retaliatory capability and so that the United States can regain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control;

(3) Allow the United States-Soviet negotiations to lapse informally; and

(4) Support chemical weapons arms control discussions in the Committee on Disarmament leading to multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a chemical weapons prohibition, if further interagency study should support such a step.*

In support of United States chemical weapons arms control objectives, the Government is directed to study and, by January 30, 1982, submit recommendations on:

* ACDA understands this paragraph to mean: Pending preparation of recommendations on, and approval of, a United States position for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a chemical weapons prohibition, the United States shall continue to support chemical weapons arms control discussions in the Committee on Disarmament up to, but not including, negotiations of actual treaty text.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

- United States' positions on strengthened verification requirements;
- requirements for declarations of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities;
- relationship of the United States' position on chemical weapons to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies; and
- consultations with the United States allies on a strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere.

SECRET